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INTRODUCTION 
Business law does not exist in a vacuum. Escalating concerns over 
climate change, rising socioeconomic inequality, and other complex 
challenges have accelerated the search for sustainable relationships to bind 
our global community.1 Our growing awareness of the risks at hand has 
resulted in mounting expectations for corporations to transform, innovate, 
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. Thank you to Kyle Fogden, Chuck
O’Kelley, Lori Lamb, the participants of The Benefit Corporation and the Firm Commitment Universe 
symposium at the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society at Seattle University 
School of Law, and Stephanie Gambino and the editors of the Seattle University Law Review, for 
helpful comments. Thank you also to Sergio Ortega (University of Victoria, J.D. 2018) for exceptional 
research assistance. 
1. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS (10th ed., 2015), http://reports.weforum.org/
global-risks-2015/executive-summary/ [https://perma.cc/7AUL-YBHS]. 
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and play a role in lessening those risks.2 The term “corporate social 
responsibility” (CSR) may no longer be an appropriate descriptor for 
trends within the movement.3 Rather, “social innovation” is becoming the 
new catchphrase of the day, emerging as the auspicious cousin to CSR as 
corporations move toward integrating business concepts with social 
activism in order to solve pressing social and environmental problems.4 
The growth of the “social enterprise,” often referring to either a for-profit 
trying to “do good,” an enterprising nonprofit, or a corporate group 
formation of the two, suggests a shift in the business landscape.5 
Legislators are beginning to craft new corporate legal entities to meet 
growing demands from social entrepreneurs seeking governing 
infrastructure to house their social businesses. 
Corporate hybridity is a new innovation in business law that had its 
start in industry and is garnering attention within academic scholarship. In 
the corporate context, a “hybrid”6 can be defined as a corporate legal 
structure that blends traditional for-profit and nonprofit legal 
characteristics that enable—and at times, require—businesses to pursue 
both economic and social mandates. Canada has begun to act upon this 
new legal phenomenon, with two provinces adopting hybrid corporations 
similar to the community interest company in the United Kingdom (U.K.), 
2. See, e.g., David A. Lubin & Daniel C. Esty, The Sustainability Imperative, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May 2010. 
3. The prospect of defining CSR is not an easy one, and this Article refrains from delving into
that debate. Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon explain the difficulty in that “[f]irst, . . . CSR is an 
‘essentially contested concept,’ being ‘appraisive’ (or considered as valued), ‘internally complex,’ and 
having relatively open rules of application. Second, CSR is an umbrella term overlapping with some, 
and being synonymous with other, conceptions of business-society relations. Third, it has clearly been 
a dynamic phenomenon.” Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, “Implicit” and “Explicit” CSR: A Conceptual 
Framework for a Comparative Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility, 33:2 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 404, 405 (2008) (internal citations omitted). Ultimately, “[t]heories of corporate social 
responsibility cast a potentially broader net, emphasizing all of the social costs of corporate activity, 
and therefore embrace, for example, environmental or political concerns as well as stakeholder 
interests.” David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production 
Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1002 n.5 (2000). 
4. See, e.g., Tim Draimin, Corporate Social Responsibility is Dead, Long Live Corporate Social 
Innovation, SOC. INNOVATION GENERATION (July 12, 2010), http://www.sigeneration.ca/corporate-
social-responsibility-is-dead-long-live-corporate-social-innovation%E2%80%A8/ [https://perma.cc/ 
M9BS-NF5X]; Chris Atchison, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Clear Business Case, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/education/corporate-social-
responsibility-a-clear-business-case/article599864/ [https://perma.cc/3ZU9-4J5Q]. 
5. See, e.g., Victor Pestoff & Lars Hulgård, Participatory Governance in Social Enterprise, 27
VOLUNTAS 1742 (2016). 
6. Also known as a “blended enterprise.” See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and
Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619 (2010). 
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providing traditional nonprofit organizations with a means to raise equity 
capital and issue a capped amount of dividends.7 
In past years, Canadian legislators have felt pressure to implement 
the American benefit corporation model into existing provincial and 
federal corporate laws.8 The benefit corporation aims to address the needs 
of social purpose businesses operating in the for-profit sector by requiring 
a “public benefit” purpose, among other governing features. B Lab, the 
nonprofit organization behind the American B Corporation certification, 
has actively lobbied its own state governments to adopt the benefit 
corporation form. At one point it seemed B Lab had saturated the Canadian 
social sector, partnering with several of Canada’s leading social innovators 
to advocate for the benefit corporation model.9 Ontario and British 
Columbia (B.C.) were particular hotspot provinces where benefit 
corporation legislation was being contemplated. MaRS Discovery District, 
a Canadian hub in social innovation, initiated a White Paper urging 
legislators to create an equivalent to the benefit corporation, calling it “an 
opportunity for Canada.”10 In 2012, the B.C. Council for Social Innovation 
issued an action plan to maximize social innovation in B.C., which 
                                                     
 7. The British Columbia “community contribution company” (known as the C3) was made 
available to businesses in July 2013. See Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57 (Can.). A 
similar hybrid was made publicly available in Nova Scotia in 2016. See Community Interest 
Companies Act, S.N.S. 2012, c 38 (Can.). The B.C. and Nova Scotia hybrids are modeled after the 
U.K. community interest company, with governing features that include an asset lock and dividend 
cap. The U.K. CIC has had considerable success since its implementation in 2005, with more than 
12,500 registered CICs to date (overtaking the number of cooperatives in the country). See Office of 
the Regulator of Community Interest Companies (@CICRegulator), TWITTER (Nov. 18, 2016, 2:17 
AM), https://twitter.com/CICRegulator/status/799557182815670272 (tweeting the number of CICs on 
public record as of November 18, 2016, at 12,579); see also OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF 
COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, CIC REGULATOR: ANNUAL REPORT 2015 TO 2016 (2016). In 
B.C., the C3 has not been nearly as successful. For more on the C3 model, see Carol Liao, Limits to 
Corporate Reform and Alternative Legal Structures, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL 
BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 297 (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin Richardson eds., 2015). 
 8. See, e.g., Simon Avery, Canada Playing Catch-up in Social Enterprise, GLOBE & MAIL  
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/small-business/sb-growth/can-
ada-playing-catch-up-in-social-enterprise/article1316055/ [https://perma.cc/VAB9-H79X]. 
 9. Adam Spence, In Search of the Benefit Corporation, MARS CTR. FOR IMPACT INVESTING 
(Nov. 25, 2010), https://www.marsdd.com/news-and-insights/in-search-of-the-benefit-corporation/ 
[https://perma.cc/DK3C-BYGD]; Rachel Mendleson, Canadian ‘B Corps’ Put Their Money Where 
Their Branding Is On Social Causes, HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (Feb. 3, 2012, 6:25 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/02/02/canada-b-corps-benefitcorporations_n_1251383.html 
[https://perma.cc/FSR7-R32E]; 
 10. STACEY CORRIVEAU ET AL., BENEFIT CORPORATIONS IN CANADA: A TOOL TO SUPPORT 
BLENDED ENTERPRISE IN CANADA, MARS CENTRE FOR IMPACT INVESTING (2011) (on file with 
author). 
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included the recommendation that the government explore the possibility 
of creating public benefit corporations.11 
While the American benefit corporation has been heralded as the 
innovative solution to the shareholder primacy model of governance, 
many advocates tend to assume that Canadian corporate laws are one and 
the same as the United States’ (U.S.) corporate laws. These advocates have 
failed to compare the legal features of the American benefit corporation 
alongside existing Canadian corporate laws to ensure a meaningful 
alternative is offered. Canada should explore the creation of legal hybrids 
that offer social enterprises with governing infrastructure to pursue dual 
economic and social mandates. However, adopting the American benefit 
corporation model does not make legal sense in Canada, as most of its 
stakeholder-based governance features are equal to or even weaker than 
Canada’s existing model of governance. This Article will explain why the 
adoption of the benefit corporation in Canada is unadvisable, in hopes of 
shifting energies toward more effective reform efforts in Canada. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief background and description of 
the American benefit corporation. Part II then delineates the Canadian 
model of corporate law and governance as it currently stands in the 
statutes, common law, and in practice. Part III applies the information 
gathered from the previous two sections to explain why the legal features 
in the American benefit corporation model are largely redundant to 
existing Canadian corporate laws. It also addresses how the 
implementation of the benefit corporation in Canada would conflate 
incorrect assumptions on Canada’s model of governance and potentially 
impede the progressive development of Canada’s corporate laws. The 
Article concludes by offering suggestions to the leaders of the American 
benefit corporation movement in the wake of the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
election. 
I. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN BENEFIT CORPORATION 
The consideration of stakeholder interests has generally been 
allowed in for-profit corporations under several American state laws since 
the 1980s. The takeover boom saw several states implement “other 
constituency” (also known as “nonshareholder constituency”12 or 
“corporate constituency”13) legislation expressly permitting directors to 
                                                     
 11. BC SOCIAL INNOVATION COUNCIL, ACTION PLAN RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAXIMIZE 
SOCIAL INNOVATIONS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 11 (2012), http://tamarackcci.ca/files/social-
innovationbc_action_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWC5-6QHA]. 
 12. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. 
REV. 991, 973 (1992). 
 13. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 579–80 (1992). 
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consider interests of groups in addition to shareholders in  
decision-making.14 A large majority of American states are now “other 
constituency” states15—only six states to date have not implemented such 
legislation.16 
The nonprofit B Lab began in 2008 and capitalized on the “other 
constituency” statutes by creating a certification system that also requires 
corporations to enshrine stakeholder interests into their governing 
documents.17 The B Corporation certification is unique in this regard;  
B Lab has elected to address governance issues in a way that is unrivalled 
by other CSR certifications on the market. Self-imposed and privately 
regulated, B Lab is attempting to establish a new kind of company that 
harnesses the power of business to solve social and environmental 
problems.18 At the time of this writing, the B Lab website indicates that 
there are more than 1,929 certified B Corporations, including 927 
American B Corporations and 160 Canadian B Corporations,19 with the 
remaining number representing B Corporations originating from other 
countries.20 
While the numbers are sizable given the grassroots nature of the B 
Corporation, they are of course small relative to the number of 
corporations existing in the United States, which, according to the U.S. 
Census Bureau, totals more than 27 million businesses.21 Corporations 
may choose to become B Corporations so they can align themselves with 
like-minded companies. The B Corporation branding may “draw in 
directors committed to a blended mission and investors willing to enforce 
                                                     
 14. For more on this, see Andrew R. Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency 
Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder Value and All That: Much Ado About Little? (Jan. 4, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript); Bainbridge, supra note 12; Mitchell, supra note 13. 
 15. Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 833 n.78 (2003). 
 16. Corporation Legal Roadmap, B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/1061-corporation-legal-roadmap [https://perma.cc/JX3X-55B4]. The 
states without non-shareholder constituency statutes are Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, North 
Carolina, and Oklahoma. 
 17. Corporation Legal Roadmap, supra note 16. 
 18. B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net. 
 19. These numbers were determined using the website’s country search engine. Find a B Corp, 
B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/community/find-a-b-corp [https://perma.cc/UR86-
Q27B]. It should be noted that inconsistencies are likely, given that the number of B Corporations 
listed on their homepage differs from the number of B Corporations listed on their B Community page 
(1,929 versus 1,730). Id. 
 20. See Find a B Corp, supra note 19. 
 21. Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/ 
BZA010214/00 [https://perma.cc/EX7Q-K3QZ] (this number is as of 2012; more recent statistics are 
unavailable). 
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it.”22 It could one day be a certification popularly recognizable by a wider 
number of consumers. 
Since B Lab is a private organization and does not have the authority 
to manipulate existing laws, it instead works with existing laws to guide 
corporations to change their framework. While it was fair to say that early 
on B Lab’s focus seemed to lean toward attracting mass participation 
rather than ensuring proper regulation, there have been notable changes in 
its governance. In the past, B Lab was a relatively small organization that 
was not equipped to regulate a large number of companies, particularly 
given its additional involvement in legislative policymaking and attention 
to marketing its brand.23 B Lab has since expanded in size, improved its 
oversight, and collaborated with several international partners in the 
pursuit of global brand recognition. 
In order to become a certified B Corporation, a company is first 
required to take a “B Impact Assessment” that asks questions relating to 
accountability, employees, consumers, community, and the 
environment.24 A corporation is “certified” by B Lab once an acceptable 
score is obtained under their rating system (80 out of 200), and the 
company is required to submit supporting documents for a portion of the 
answers.25 B Lab relies on this self-reporting assessment and a separate 
auditing system to ensure B Corporations are pursuing and achieving their 
social mandates.26 Within an allotted time following certification, B 
Corporations are required to amend their articles of incorporation to 
require directors to consider more than just shareholder interests when 
carrying out their duties.27 Companies that have benefit corporation 
legislation in their states are required to adopt the benefit corporation 
status within two years of certification.28 Previously, B Lab required 
companies to be incorporated in an “other constituency” state, or  
re-incorporate in one in order to make such amendments and be a certified 
B Corporation. Now, B Lab allows companies in states that are not “other 
constituency” states to simply build stakeholder interests into a signed 
                                                     
 22. Brakman Reiser, supra note 6, at 643. 
 23. Find a B Corp, supra note 19. 
 24. Assess your Impact, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT, http://bimpactassessment.net/how-it-
works/assess-your-impact [https://perma.cc/W7GG-TACY]. 
 25. Performance Requirements, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/performance-requirements [https://perma.cc/5RCV-FBFZ]. 
 26. For a detailed analysis of the B Impact Assessment, please see Michael Dorff, Assessing the 
Assessment: B Lab’s Effort to Measure Companies’ Benevolence, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 515 (2017). 
 27. Protect Your Mission, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/why-become-a-b-corp/protect-your-mission [https://perma.cc/W3Q6-ZR7A]. 
 28. Corporation Legal Roadmap, supra note 16. In a few states, companies are given the option 
to simply amend their articles of incorporation. States that fall under this exception include Idaho, 
Louisiana, and New York. 
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term sheet.29 If the company’s resident state eventually creates a benefit 
corporation, the company must adopt benefit corporation status within the 
later of four years of the legislation or two years after certification.30 
In addition to marketing its certification process, B Lab has been 
influential in persuading state legislators to create benefit corporations. In 
2010, the states of Maryland and Vermont each passed benefit corporation 
legislation, facilitating new corporate structures designed to create both 
social benefits and shareholder value.31 Maryland’s benefit corporation 
laws took effect in October 201032 and Vermont’s in July 2011.33  
Twenty-nine states have since followed suit with various forms of the 
benefit corporation, with Delaware being a notable state that passed 
legislation in 2013.34 B Lab states that seven other states are in the interim 
stages of implementing legislation.35 The governing features in benefit 
corporations vary somewhat from state to state, but many common 
features across several of the states echo those first enacted in Maryland 
and Vermont, and later in the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation;36 
thus, these two states are used as the example.37 
The purpose of a benefit corporation is to create a “general public 
benefit,” which is defined as “a material positive impact on society and the 
environment, as measured by a third-party standard, through activities that 
promote some combination of specific public benefits.”38 A corporation 
seeking benefit corporation status must include or make a clear a 
prominent statement in its articles of incorporation that it is a benefit 
corporation.39 There are no specific criteria to qualify as a benefit 
                                                     
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Press Release, Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation  
(Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Union-to-
Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation [https://perma.cc/LJB4-UAS9]; Vermont Becomes Second 
State to Pass B Corporation Legislation Outdoor Industry Association, OUTDOOR INDUSTRY ASS’N 
(June 2, 2010), https://outdoorindustry.org/article/vermont-becomes-second-state-to-pass-b-
corporation-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/BVR8-58A9]. 
 32. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s §§ 5-6c-01 through 5-6c-08 (West 2010). 
 33. Vermont Benefit Corporations Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21 (2011). 
 34. State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/ 
policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/Y7U5-72UC]. For the Delaware legislation, see 8 
DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 361–368 (West 2013). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Model Legislation, BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-
legislation [https://perma.cc/5MP2-QMNR]. 
 37. For a look at the differences between state statutes, please see J. Haskell Murray, Corporate 
Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes (Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556. 
 38. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s §§ 5-6c-01(c) (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, 
§ 21.03(4) (2011). 
 39. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s §§ 5-6c-03, 5-6c-05; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.05. 
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corporation so long as proper company approvals have been met, and that 
also applies if a company wishes to withdraw from being a benefit 
corporation. Existing state corporate laws fill any gaps in the benefit 
corporation laws. 
The assumed purpose behind the legal amendments required to 
become a benefit corporation is to carve these corporations out of the  
well-known court decision of Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.40 (Revlon). In Revlon, the Supreme Court of Delaware held 
that directors owe a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value in 
takeover contexts, regardless of nonshareholder stakeholder interests.41 
The Revlon decision is generally regarded as the leading judicial precedent 
in support of shareholder primacy in corporate America, and B Lab has 
elected to address the matter directly. B Lab’s language to be included in 
a B Corporation’s articles of incorporation requires directors to consider 
various stakeholder interests.42 Obligating directors to consider 
                                                     
 40. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 41. Id. at 182. 
 42. The language is as follows: 
a) In discharging the duties of their respective positions and in considering the best 
interests of the Company, the board of directors, committees of the board, and individual 
directors shall consider the effects of any action or inaction upon: 
i) the members of the Company; 
ii) the employees and work force of the Company, its subsidiaries, and its 
suppliers; 
iii) the interests of its customers as beneficiaries of the purpose of the Company to 
have a material positive impact on society and the environment; 
iv) community and societal factors, including those of each community in which 
offices or facilities of the Company, its subsidiaries, or its suppliers are located; 
v) the local and global environment; 
vi) the short-term and long-term interests of the Company, including benefits that 
may accrue to the Company from its long-term plans and the possibility that these 
interests may be best served by the continued independence of the Company; and 
vii) the ability of the Company to create a material positive impact on society and 
the environment, taken as a whole. 
b) In discharging his or her duties, and in determining what is in the best interests of the 
Company, a Director shall not be required to regard any interest, or the interests of any 
particular group affected by such action, including the shareholders, as a dominant or 
controlling interest or factor. 
c) A director does not have a duty to any person other than a shareholder in its capacity 
as a shareholder with respect to the purpose of the Company or the obligations set forth 
in this Article, and nothing in this Article express or implied, is intended to create or 
shall create or grant any right in or for any person other than a shareholder or any cause 
of action by or for any person other than a shareholder [or the corporation]. 
d) Notwithstanding the foregoing, any director is entitled to rely on the provisions 
regarding “best interests” as set forth above in enforcing his or her rights hereunder, and 
under state law and such reliance shall not, absent another breach, be construed as a 
breach of a director’s duty of care, even in the context of a change in control transaction 
where, as a result of weighing the interests set forth in subsection (a)(i)-(vii) above 
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nonshareholder stakeholders, rather than simply permitting them to do so, 
is a significant legal difference. Obligatory duties hold directors to a higher 
standard, and B Lab’s language has evolved considerably in the past years. 
It formerly included the insertion of “as the Director deems relevant,” 
which considerably softened the obligation and echoed common law. At 
the time of this Article, the proposed language is far lengthier, but 
similarly offers considerable softening of such obligations.43 
This codification of stakeholder interests in directorial  
decision-making for B Corporations is regarded by some as a significant 
feature emulated by the benefit corporation laws, if not the most important 
feature. In Maryland, a director is required to consider the effects of any 
action or inaction on stockholders,44 employees, subsidiaries, suppliers, 
customers, community and societal considerations, and the local and 
global environment.45 Vermont has an additional sixth factor, 
encompassing “the long-term and short-term interests of the benefit 
corporation, including the possibility that those interests may be best 
served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation.”46 In 
contrast to the standard articulated in Revlon, this additional factor 
provides substantially the same protection as offered by the B Corporation 
model by relieving directors of the duties to maximize shareholder value 
in a takeover situation.  
                                                     
[which lists certain stakeholder interests], a director determines to accept an offer, 
between two competing offers, with a lower price per share. 
Corporation Legal Roadmap, supra note 16. 
 43. Id. 
 44. In Maryland and certain other states, the term ‘stockholder’ is used instead of ‘shareholder.’ 
See MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s § 5-6c-07(a)(1)(i) (West 2010). 
 45. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s § 5-6c-07(a)(1). Vermont has some de minimis differences 
in wording. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1) (2011). 
 46. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1)(F). The explicit inclusion offers symbolic vindication 
for Vermont, home of the socially minded ice cream business Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. 
(popularly known as Ben & Jerry’s). The board of Ben & Jerry’s had multiple offers to purchase the 
company in 2000, but had no choice but to sell to the highest bidder or risk a shareholder lawsuit. 
News Release, Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Ben & Jerry’s and Unilever to Join Forces in Ice Cream 
(Apr. 12, 2000), http://www.benjerry.com/company/media-center/press/join-forces.html [https:// 
perma.cc/32BL-AGN4]; Dave Gram, States Move to Let Firms Pursue Social Mission, BOSTON 
GLOBE (Apr. 11, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/vermont/articles/2010/04/11/ 
states_move_to_let_firms_pursue_social_mission/. But see Anthony Page & Robert A Katz, Freezing 
Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211 (2010) 
(arguing that Ben & Jerry’s had strict anti-takeover defenses that their board declined to test, and that 
negative reactions to the sale of social enterprises may be misguided since such sales may create more 
opportunities for social enterprises to do good work). Ben & Jerry’s has since become the first wholly 
owned subsidiary to become a B Corporation. Press Release, Ben & Jerry’s Joins the Growing B 
Corporation Movement (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/34773-Ben-Jerry-s-
Joins-the-Growing-B-Corporation-Movement [https://perma.cc/7NM9-CWKB]. 
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In Maryland, the director has no duty (fiduciary or otherwise) to a 
person who is a general public beneficiary of the benefit corporation.47 
Vermont, however, has slightly expanded the definition of fiduciary duties 
for their directors. Vermont directors have fiduciary duties only to those 
persons entitled to bring about a benefit enforcement proceeding against 
the benefit corporation.48 A benefit enforcement proceeding means a claim 
or action against a director or officer for failing to pursue the public benefit 
purpose set forth in its articles of incorporation, or for violating any duty 
in the statute.49 These persons have been identified as shareholders, 
directors, persons, or groups of persons that own 10% or more of the equity 
interests in an entity where the benefit corporation is a subsidiary, or any 
other persons specified in the articles of incorporation of the benefit 
corporation.50  
While the expansion may seem slight, it is important. Shareholders, 
and shareholders of any parent company, can bring proceedings against 
the benefit corporation for violating the broader, codified stakeholder 
interests.51 However, directors have the same immunity from liability as 
directors of regular, for-profit corporations.52 American courts have 
validated the business judgment rule, meaning that the courts will defer to 
the board’s judgment so long as the directors brought an appropriate 
degree of diligence in reaching a reasonable business decision at the 
particular time that it was made.53 So, provided that the board’s decision is 
within a range of reasonable alternatives and any actions do not constitute 
fraud or negligence, the courts are unlikely to intrude upon a director’s 
business judgment. 
A benefit corporation is also responsible for creating an annual 
benefit report, with Vermont requiring board approval prior to the report 
being sent out to shareholders.54 The report is required to include: (1) a 
description of how the benefit corporation pursued a public benefit during 
the year and the extent to which the public benefit was created; (2) any 
                                                     
 47. MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s § 5-6c-07(b). 
 48. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.09(d), (e), 21.13. 
 49. Id. § 21.13(c). 
 50. Id. § 21.13(b). 
 51. Vermont’s expansion of duties has thus required setting out proper parameters of directors’ 
duties. See § 21.09(a)(3) (directors are not obligated to give priority to the interests of a particular 
group or person listed under § 21.09(a)(1)); see also § 21.09(a)(4) (directors are not subject to a 
different or higher standard of care when decisions may affect the control of the benefit corporation); 
§ 21.09(c) (a director is not liable for the failure of a benefit corporation to create general or specific 
public benefit). 
 52. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.11(d), 21.02(b) (2011). 
 53. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (outlining the business judgment test). 
 54. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a), (c) (2011). MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s  
§ 5-6c-08(a) (West 2010). 
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circumstances that hindered the creation of the public benefit; and (3) an 
assessment of the societal and environmental performance of the benefit 
corporation, prepared in accordance with a third-party standard.55 
Vermont includes explicit instructions on how the report must be 
constructed, such as outlining specific goals or outcomes, disclosing the 
amount of compensation paid to each director, and the name of each 
shareholder owning 5% or more of the shares.56 These additions add a 
heightened level of transparency and accountability that echoes some of 
the disclosure requirements of public companies.57 Vermont has also 
created the requirement for one director of the board to be designated as a 
“benefit director,” who is required to be independent and prepare an 
annual statement detailing whether, in the opinion of that director, the 
company acted in accordance with its benefit purpose, and if not, why.58 
This statement and the annual benefit report are to be delivered and 
approved by the shareholders and also posted on the company website.59 
The benefit corporation is regarded as a potential alternative to 
shareholder primacy to combat negative corporate behavior that may be 
damaging to broader community, environmental, or other stakeholder 
interests.60 Several states do not track the names and number of benefit 
corporations, so it is difficult to determine how many are currently in 
operation, but there are estimations putting the number at approximately 
2,600 or more nationally in 2016.61 
II. CANADA’S MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE62 
Consistently ranked as one of the best places to live by the United 
Nations Annual Human Development Report,63 Canada is an interesting 
                                                     
 55. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a). Vermont has also required a statement of the 
corporation’s specific goals or outcomes, and actions the corporation has taken to attain them while 
also improving its social and environmental performance. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a)(1)(D). 
 56. Id. § 21.14(a)(4)–(7). 
 57. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.14(b), 21.14(d); MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Assn’s 
§ 5-6c-08(b)–(c). 
 58. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10. 
 59. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(c)–(d). 
 60. Janine S. Hiller, The Benefit Corporation and Corporate Social Responsibility, 118 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 287, 287 (2013). 
 61. Find a Benefit Corporation, BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION CENTER, http://benefitcorp.net/ 
businesses/find-a-benefit-corp [https://perma.cc/G58Z-237K]; J. Haskell Murray Presentation at the 
Seattle University Law Review Symposium: Berle VIII: Benefit Corporations and the Firm 
Commitment Universe (June 27–28, 2016).  
 62. As noted above, this Part II summarizes the findings from Carol Liao, A Canadian Model of 
Corporate Governance, 37 DALHOUSIE L.J. 559 (2014) [hereinafter Liao, CFGR Study]. Much of the 
language in this Part II closely tracks some portions of the CFGR study. 
 63. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en [https://perma.cc/RW4U-HCPU] (various years). 
694 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:683 
country in which to study the growing development of hybrid business 
laws. Understanding Canada’s existing legal model of governance, 
however, has its own set of challenges. Canadian directors are inundated 
with American corporate governance research, leading many directors to 
assume Canadian and American governance fundamentals are identical. 
In fact, there are important differences found in Canadian corporate laws 
that are highly relevant to the discussion of whether benefit corporations 
are warranted in Canada. This Part II identifies some of Canada’s 
foundational corporate laws and colors them with insights from a 
qualitative study conducted by this author and sponsored by the Canadian 
Foundation for Governance Research (the CFGR study), where leading 
senior practitioners in Canada opined on matters involving shareholder 
primacy, director duties, stakeholder interests, the courts, regulators, and 
the future direction of Canadian corporate governance.64 The candid 
observations from the practitioners, who provided comments in the CFGR 
study on a not-for-attribution basis, reveal a surprising legal and regulatory 
landscape in Canada. 
A. “Best Interests of the Corporation” 
Under Section 122 of the Canada Business Corporations Act 
(CBCA), directors and officers are required to manage the corporation in 
the “best interests of the corporation.”65 This is notably different from the 
United States, where most states require directors to act in the “best 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders[,]” but shareholder 
interests (equating to shareholder value) are prioritized.66 The topic of the 
debate, then, is whether or not the difference between “best interests of the 
corporation” and “best interests of the shareholders” is simply a technical 
one or if there is a noteworthy difference. In the CFGR study, a majority 
of the practitioners noted how even if there was a theoretical difference it 
was “largely indistinguishable” in practice because a business case could 
be made that best interests of the corporation equated to that of the 
shareholders.67 Others held comparably strong views on the fact that there 
was a significant distinction, including one prominent practitioner, who 
stated: 
                                                     
 64. See Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62. 
 65. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 122 (Can.) [hereinafter CBCA] 
(“[E]very director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties 
shall act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation” and “exercise 
the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable 
circumstances.”). 
 66. Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  
 67. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 572. 
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It’s entirely different, that is not our common law….It should be a 
matter of complete indifference to the directors what the interests of 
the shareholders are, except if it makes a difference to the 
corporation. There’s nothing wrong with taking shareholders’ 
interests into account, but that’s incidental….I don’t think the law 
could possibly be clearer if you look at the corporate statutes and look 
at what the courts have said.68 
Now, this difference may only be realized in a small number of 
situations, particularly mergers or acquisitions when a company is being 
faced with a takeover. Nevertheless, the difference is there, certainly in 
theory if not in practice. Shareholders are important stakeholders in any 
corporation, and their interests are certainly not ones that boards should 
take lightly, but Canadian law is clear that the board’s primary duties are 
to the corporation.69 
One practitioner in the CFGR study distinguished how American 
jurisprudence “is more clearly articulate that the interest of the shareholder 
should be foremost in the thoughts of the board in terms of maximizing 
shareholder value than perhaps has been articulated historically in the 
Canadian jurisprudence.”70 There is, therefore, “a slightly different focus 
in Canada.”71 In terms of its application, one practitioner described it as a 
“kind of continuum,” where the obligation to consider decreases as the 
strength of the relationship with other constituents decreases.72 Many 
practitioners expressed how one can easily make an argument that if the 
corporation is acting in the best interests of all of its stakeholders, over 
time the wealth of shareholders will be maximized.73 Most agreed (with a 
few exceptions) that the shareholders should be the foremost priority for 
directors, with other stakeholders’ interests being considered depending 
on the issue at hand.74 
One of the practitioners that found a stark difference between the best 
interests of the corporation versus the shareholders admitted that 
“certainly the entire shareholder community in Canada would say it’s all 
about the shareholders, absolutely.”75 Nevertheless, the practitioner 
                                                     
 68. Id. at 571. 
 69. CBCA, supra note 65. 
 70. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 571. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. A number of practitioners implied that the negligible difference could become relevant in 
narrow circumstances. For example, the difference could become acute in times of financial distress 
or when a significant stakeholder is involved. Two practitioners gave the example of a pipeline across 
the First Nations territory, where, in that scenario, the corporation should have regard to the broader 
interest of stakeholders. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 571. 
 75. Id. 
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reiterated that doing what is in the best interests of the corporation is really 
something for the directors to determine, and is not beholden to any 
particular stakeholder group, including shareholders.76 When this 
practitioner was informed that other participants felt that “best interests of 
the corporation” and “best interests of the shareholders” were of negligible 
difference, the practitioner responded: 
If you are trying to advise a board in a manner that keeps them out of 
harm’s way, that’s different. Providing that kind of advice, 
practically speaking for a lawyer advising a client, is much different 
than talking about the legal theory. Because you can have all kinds of 
laws, but when you’ve got one group who is the most likely to sue 
you, you tend to worry about that group…People’s sense of right and 
wrong will also change over time but I don’t think the legal theory is 
going to change. So it is kind of a flexible concept that can 
accommodate a lot of different views of a lot of different kinds of 
directors.77 
A few practitioners echoed this sentiment, reflecting on how Canada 
is more flexible in that it can, in any particular set of circumstances, put 
the best interests of the corporation to a wider group of stakeholders.78 In 
a change of control context, unlike Delaware and other states, the 
Canadian board is not beholden to act as an auctioneer with the sale going 
to the highest bidder. The courts have also gone on to draw a more notable 
distinction in this fundamental difference in governance, as will be seen in 
the subsequent sections. 
B. The Oppression Remedy and Other Stakeholder Protections 
There are several minority protections within Canadian corporate 
law and the oppression remedy is one of Canada’s most notable 
protections. The oppression remedy, set forth in Section 241 of the CBCA 
and similar provincial statutes, offers a broader right of action on behalf 
of certain stakeholders to apply to a court to rectify matters complained of 
where: 
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates 
effects a result, 
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates 
are or have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or 
                                                     
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 573. 
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(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its 
affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards 
the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the 
court may make an order to rectify the matters complained of.79 
The oppression remedy has been acknowledged as “beyond question, 
the broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended shareholder 
remedy in the common law world,”80 and this right of action goes beyond 
the shareholders of a corporation. Ultimately, the remedy seeks to prevent 
unfair disregard of stakeholder interests. The complainant can be a current 
or former security holder, current or former director or officer, the Director 
under the CBCA, or any other proper person as determined by the court.81 
Courts in the past have allowed claims by creditors, certain employees, 
and minority shareholders in widely held corporations to bring forth 
claims, and there are indications of potential broadening under this 
provision.82 If the court does find oppression, unfair prejudice, or unfair 
disregard to the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or 
officer, or other person, then the court “may make an order to rectify the 
matters that are being complained about.”83 The test that has developed 
from the courts has been one of foreseeability and reasonable expectations 
that can arise through the relationship with the corporation, and these 
reasonable expectations seem capable of changing over time.84  
Non-monetary interests may be reasonable expectations and have been 
taken into account by the courts.85 
As to the kinds of remedial orders a court can make, American 
counterparts are often surprised to learn how much discretion is left to the 
courts. Section 241(3) of the CBCA provides a non-exhaustive list of 
possible remedies available.86 Judges have commented on the breadth of 
the oppression remedy and how it “gives the court tremendous latitude” 
allowing a judge “to use his [or her] ingenuity to effect the remedy most 
                                                     
 79. CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 241. 
 80. Stanley M. Beck, Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the 1980s, in CORPORATE LAW IN THE 
80S, SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA 312 (1982) (quoted in Sparling v. 
Javelin Int’l Ltd. [1986] R.J.Q. 1073, 1077 (Que. S.C.) (Can.)). 
 81. CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 238. 
   82. MARKUS KOEHNEN, OPPRESSION AND RELATED REMEDIES (Carswell 2014). Koehnen 
notes that the standing provisions for oppression actions in Canadian corporate law statutes are the 
broadest in the common law world. Id. at 7 n.12.   
 83. CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 241(2). 
 84. Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially 
Considered: 1995-2001, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 79, 83 (2004). 
 85. Id. at 82. 
 86. CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 241(3). 
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suitable to the situation.”87 Courts can set aside a transaction, make a 
corporation or another person buy the oppressed party’s shares or pay 
money, dissolve the corporation, or any other appropriate remedy.88 The 
court has discretion to offer any appropriate remedy it wants to rectify the 
oppression, and scholars have noted that Canadian courts have been rather 
innovative in creating remedies for successful applicants.89 
In the CFGR study, many practitioners noted that Canada is home to 
several controlled companies and, as such, strong minority protection is 
particularly important.90 It is easy for both founding and institutional 
shareholders to be able to exert extreme pressure on boards.91 Due to those 
significant players and illiquid stock, one practitioner noted how 
“movement in the stock can be quite dramatic.”92 That being said, there 
was overwhelming agreement that the principle of minority shareholder 
protection was “baked into our corporate law.”93 Given the several options 
available to minority shareholders and other stakeholders, there tended to 
be consensus that in Canada, “we are well taken care of.”94 The oppression 
remedy and, in the context of public companies, Multilateral Instrument 
61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions 
(MI 61-101)95 from the securities regulators were often cited by 
practitioners as significant protections.96 Others also raised the ability to 
                                                     
 87. See 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd. (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 113, 123 (Can.). 
 88. CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 241. 
 89. Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note 84, at 106. 
 90. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 583. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. There were two notable exceptions in the group. One practitioner felt that there “is not 
enough of a corporate perspective to protect the minority—it needs to go further” and “would just 
prefer to see it dealt with in corporate legislation, rather than securities.” Id. at 584 n.41. Another, who 
did support the principle of minority protection, felt somewhat less sympathetic towards the plight of 
minority shareholders, reflecting on how “if I buy shares as a minority in a controlled corporation, I do 
so knowing that it is a controlled corporation and that there’s going to be a controlling shareholder 
at the end of the day.” Id.  
 95. Multilateral Instrument 61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special 
Transactions, OSC MI 61-101, 31 OSCB 1321, (Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter MI 61-101]. 
 96. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 584. 
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bring derivative actions,97 and to specific rules under the Toronto Stock 
Exchange requiring minority approvals.98 
In particular, a number of practitioners expressed how the minority 
protection principle was “more true in Canada than in the US,” in that “we 
are fairly unique” by having the concept of an oppression remedy as it 
protects not only minority shareholders but other stakeholders as well.99 
One commented on how the oppression remedy in the past was existing 
“but only theoretically available,” whereas now it becomes an important 
tool in corporate law.100 Another expressed that the remedy “really does 
work” in that “it scares the majority shareholders more than anything. You 
can get into court in pretty short order; courts do listen even though the 
cases may have gone a lot of times the other way.”101 Regarding MI  
61-101, most felt it had gone a long way toward ensuring procedural and 
substantive fairness in related party transactions.102 
Overall, most felt there was a good balance between the oppression 
remedy and MI 61-101 in protecting minority interests.103 Reflecting on 
Canada’s position, a few practitioners expressed how the strength of 
Canada’s statutory remedies, some of which specifically take into account 
the interests of other stakeholders, meant that Canada “cannot have a 
                                                     
 97. A derivative action set forth under s. 239 of the CBCA and similar provincial statutes creates 
a broader right of action for certain stakeholders (such as creditors), in addition to shareholders, to 
bring an action on behalf of a corporation to enforce the directors’ duty to the corporation when the 
directors are themselves unwilling to do so. A complainant, who may be a registered or beneficial 
holder of a security (including shares and debt obligations), a director or officer or former director or 
officer of the corporation, or “any other person who, in the discretion of the court, is a proper person 
to make an application,” may bring an action, to enforce a right of the corporation, including rights 
correlative to the duties of the officers and directors of the corporation, upon obtaining the leave of 
the court. See CBCA, supra note 65, at s. 239. A few practitioners noted that, while derivative actions 
were possible in Canada, they were not common and “terribly expensive to launch,” and very few 
practitioners referenced this option. Others highlighted how the Toronto Stock Exchange has provided 
greater protection for minority shareholders by providing majority and minority requirements for 
approval of certain types of transactions, which listed companies are required to follow. Liao, CFGR 
Study, supra note 62, at 585. 
 98. For further discussion on the role the Toronto Stock Exchange has played in Canadian 
corporate governance, see Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 593. 
 99. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 584. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. See also Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note 84, at 81. In reviewing oppression cases in Canada, 
Ben-Ishai and Puri contend that Canadian courts have applied the remedy in a way that reflects the 
primacy of shareholder interests and nexus of contracts model in corporate law. However, the 
increasing success of creditors as non-shareholder applicants pointed to a possible change in attitude 
by the courts. Ben-Ishai and Puri suggest the cautious approach by the courts is likely to continue in 
the near future. 
 102. There was an exception made by one practitioner, who felt that the rule did not prevent 
enough transactions that some would consider abusive because “it simply becomes a kind of formula 
to get through” and therefore in many instances “it just degenerates into a process.” Liao, CFGR Study, 
supra note 62, at 585. 
 103. Id. 
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model that is a hundred percent shareholder primacy.”104 Clearly, there are 
built-in principles in Canadian common law designed to protect minority 
shareholders from exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders. 
While there were some nuances as to how effective certain protections 
were in practice,105 the general sentiment amongst practitioners was that 
minority shareholder protections are well supported in Canadian statutory 
and common law rules, and that Canada also offers statutory protections 
to other stakeholders beyond shareholders.106 As seen in the following 
section, these qualities have recently been highlighted by our highest 
court. 
C. Common Law and Stakeholder Interests 
Landmark decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) have 
emphasized the statutory differences between Canada and the United 
States regarding stakeholder interests, causing many practitioners to 
inform boards that they can—and indeed should—take into account 
nonshareholder value issues. Stakeholder interests may have always had a 
role in governance under Canadian statutory laws, but the courts have now 
generated a need for boards to document their process of considering those 
interests. 
The 2004 case of Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) 
v. Wise107 stimulated several responses from legal professionals and 
scholars on its significance to the future of Canadian corporate 
governance.108 In brief, after the bankruptcy of the Peoples Department 
Stores Inc., the trustee brought an action against the company’s directors 
for breaching their fiduciary duties; prior to the bankruptcy, the company 
directors implemented a credit scheme that favored Peoples’ parent 
company, Wise Stores Inc., over its creditors.109 Regarding the “best 
interests of the corporation,” the SCC stated: 
                                                     
 104. Id. 
 105. For example, one practitioner in the CFGR study pointed to some limitations in the 
oppression remedy. It is only available against shareholders that own more than 50% of the company 
and a claimant also has to be an affiliate of the company to be a proper defendant. Since there are 
many Canadian companies controlled by 40%–45% of shareholders, the practitioner felt that the 
remedy had more limited use than one would assume. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.). 
 108. Readers are encouraged to review the several summaries and analyses that are available. 
See, e.g., Catherine Francis, Peoples Department Store Inc. v. Wise: The Expanded Scope of Directors’ 
and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Duty of Care, 41 CAN. BUS. L.J. 175 (2005); Edward Iacobucci, 
Indeterminacy and the Canadian Supreme Court’s Approach to Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 48 CAN. 
BUS. L.J. 232 (2009); Darcy L MacPherson, Supreme Court Restates Directors’ Fiduciary Duty – A 
Comment on Peoples Department Stores v. Wise, 43 ALTA L. REV. 383 (2005). 
 109. Peoples Department Stores Inc., 3 S.C.R., at para. 17. 
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[I]t is clear that the phrase the “best interests of the corporation” 
should be read not simply as the “best interests of the 
shareholders.”. . . [I]n determining whether they are acting with a 
view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, 
given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors 
to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.110 
The court cited with approval the 1972 case of Teck Corp. v. Millar, 
in which it was held that if directors “observe a decent respect for other 
interests lying beyond those of the company’s shareholders in the strict 
sense, that will not . . . leave directors open to the charge that they have 
failed in their fiduciary duty to the company.”111 Peoples also marked the 
first instance where the court specifically validated the business judgment 
rule.112 
The Supreme Court took it a step further in its highly anticipated 
2008 decision in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders.113 The court 
affirmed Peoples and appeared to further temper the shareholder primacy 
norm.114 In brief, debenture holders of Bell Canada, a subsidiary of BCE 
Inc., used the oppression remedy to seek relief concerning the privatization 
of BCE by a consortium of private equity buyers under a plan of 
arrangement that had been determined by BCE’s directors to be in the best 
interests of BCE and its shareholders. Upon the completion of the 
arrangement, the debenture holders stood to lose approximately twenty 
percent of the short-term trading value of their holdings. The SCC again 
found that directors may look to other stakeholders and also those directors 
were “not confined to short-term profit or share value,” but “[w]here the 
corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to long-term interests of the 
corporation.”115 Furthermore, the court found that when conflicts arise,  
 
                                                     
 110. Id., at para. 42. 
 111. Teck Corp v. Millar, [1972] 33 DLR (3d) 288, 2 W.W.R. 385 (BCSC) para. 97 (Can.). 
 112. Peoples Department Stores Inc., 3 S.C.R., at paras. 64–65. 
 113. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.). 
 114. Readers are again invited to review the summaries and analyses available for greater details 
on the case. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bone, The Supreme Court Revisiting Corporate Accountability: BCE 
Inc. In Search of a Legal Construct Known as the ‘Good Corporate Citizen’, ALTA. L. REV. ONLINE 
SUPPLEMENT, http://www.albertalawreview.com/index.php/alr/supplement/view/BCE-in-search-of-
good-corporate-citizen; Sarah P Bradley, BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders: The New Fiduciary 
Duties of Fair Treatment, Statutory Compliance, and Good Corporate Citizenship?, 41 OTTAWA L. 
REV. 325 (2010); Mohammad Fadel, BCE and the Long Shadow of American Corporate Law, 48 CAN. 
BUS. L.J. 190 (2009); J Anthony VanDuzer, BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders: The Supreme Court’s 
Hits and Misses in its Most Important Corporate Law Decision Since Peoples, 43 U. B.C. L. Rev. 205 
(2009). 
 115. BCE Inc., 3 S.C.R., at para. 38. (regarding the oppression remedy, the court found there 
was no violation by the directors in their fiduciary duties).   
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…it falls to the directors of the corporation to resolve them in 
accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
corporation. The cases on oppression, taken as a whole, confirm that 
this duty comprehends a duty to treat individual stakeholders affected 
by corporate actions equitably and fairly. There are no absolute rules 
and no principle that one set of interests should prevail over 
another.  In each case, the question is whether, in all the 
circumstances, the directors acted in the best interests of the 
corporation, having regard to all relevant considerations, including — 
but not confined to — the need to treat affected stakeholders in a fair 
manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a 
responsible corporate citizen.  Where it is impossible to please all 
stakeholders, it will be irrelevant that the directors rejected alternative 
transactions that were no more beneficial than the chosen one.116  
The court did not go further in describing its concept of corporate 
citizenry, so the concept’s legal viability remains to be seen. The court also 
reinforced its support for the business judgment rule.117 
In many ways, the BCE decision added confusion surrounding 
directors’ duties, particularly on whether directors may, should, or are 
obligated to consider stakeholder interests. It is simply unclear from the 
decision whether this is a mandatory duty, as some parts of the judgment 
indicate that it is permissive and others imply that it is required.118 Thus, 
in an attempt to see if there was some consensus among the group of 
leading Canadian practitioners in the CFGR study, all were asked the 
question: “Do you believe directors may, should, or are obligated to 
consider stakeholder interests?”119 
Several practitioners did not commit to one option, but chose two 
(such as “between may and should” or “they should and they are obligated 
to”). On the continuum of ‘may’ being the least restrictive for directors, 
and ‘obligated’ being the most, where the most restrictive answer was used 
as the recorded answer of the practitioner, 44% of practitioners said 
                                                     
 116. Id., at para. 81–83 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id., at para. 40. 
 118. See, e.g., Ed Waitzer & Johnny Jaswal, Peoples, BCE, and the Good Corporate “Citizen,” 
47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 439, 461 (2009). Regarding the decision, Waitzer and Jaswal noted how: 
Even the questions of whether directors may consider, should consider, or are obliged to 
consider stakeholder interests, and, if so, at what point, were not addressed clearly by the 
Court. Early in its reasons, it noted that, in Peoples, “this Court found that although 
directors must consider the best interests of the corporation, it may also be appropriate, 
although not mandatory, to consider the impact of corporate decisions on shareholders or 
particular groups of stakeholders”. Later, the Court stated that ‘the duty of directors to act 
in the best interests of the corporation comprehends a duty to treat individual 
stakeholders… equitably and fairly.’ Is this duty mandatory?  
Id. 
 119. Liao, CFGR Study, supra note 62, at 581. 
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directors were obligated to consider stakeholder interests, 40% felt that 
directors should consider them, and 16% felt directors may consider 
them.120 However, even in circumstances where one believed the law 
requires less than obligatory consideration, several practitioners 
recommended caution on the matter, saying “it’s an easy test to meet and 
it’s a foolish test to fail.”121 One practitioner in particular pointed out that 
“if you don’t pay attention to a stakeholder interest, then you are left 
defending yourself saying, ‘I didn’t have an obligation to do it.’”122 The 
practitioner went on to state: 
Why not just pay attention to it and then decide to dismiss it? This is 
where we get caught up in process so much as lawyers. It’s just a 
safer thing to do. Turn your mind to it. Decide if it’s important then 
move on. Our job is to protect our clients and so, it’d just be crazy for 
us to say, ‘you don’t have to consider that.’ It’s much safer to say, 
‘Consider it, balance it, then decide what you think is the right thing 
to do.’123 
Most found that there was little change to corporate decision-making 
subsequent to BCE, and a handful felt that this was because Canadian 
corporate law had already progressed to incorporating stakeholder 
interests through the oppression remedy and “best interests of the 
corporation,” among other things. It may be that in the past “it just wasn’t 
as open a discussion” as one practitioner put it,124 but the consideration of 
stakeholder interests is a very live issue in Canadian corporate governance 
practices. 
In the aftermath of BCE, practitioners cited a range of reasons why 
directors should consider stakeholder interests, including the business case 
for doing so, to simply play it safe given the ambiguity of Canada’s legal 
position on the matter, and concerns regarding the oppression remedy.125 
While Peoples and BCE are somewhat unclear as to whether or not the 
consideration of stakeholder interests is a mandatory requirement, 
practitioners have been advising boards to document their consideration 
of stakeholder interests since the effort is minimal enough when weighed 
against the risks. The ambiguity has resulted in an interpretation that 
favors less risk. Thus, it seems that not only has the consideration of 
stakeholder interests in Canada been calcified in board practice but so has 
the act of documenting such consideration. 
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D. The Impact of the Securities Regulators 
Despite the fact that Canadian statutes and common law have tended 
to favor a more stakeholder-based governance model, Canadian legislators 
and the courts have often taken a backseat in the development of corporate 
governance standards. Eliciting legislative change is an extremely slow 
progression and corporate legislation operates on a jurisdictional basis. 
Substantial corporate cases in Canada are also few and far between, 
meaning Canadian courts do not have the instrumentalities to promote 
good behavior. Whether by choice or through the process of elimination, 
the securities commissions are now playing a major role in shaping 
Canadian corporate governance practices. By virtue of the fact that the 
securities commissions have a ‘public interest’ jurisdiction to protect the 
capital markets,126 and by design are investor-focused, their influence has 
pushed Canadian public companies toward a more shareholder-centric 
model of governance. 
It is a curious Canadian phenomenon that the securities regulators 
are significantly affecting the corporate legal sphere. Practitioners in the 
CFGR study recounted how extraordinarily controversial it was more than 
a decade ago when the securities regulators initially began encroaching on 
a space that was traditionally for the legislatures and the courts.127 Now, 
people seem to have moved past the notion that the securities commissions 
are overstepping their jurisdiction and have generally accepted the 
regulators’ role in shaping Canadian corporate governance. Since the 
Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) are able to act on a coordinated 
basis across the nation, the organization has become a very convenient 
place to deal with change. Institutional investors deliberately seek out the 
CSA to enhance shareholder rights, even if, from a philosophical 
perspective, corporate legislation is the more appropriate venue. 
Practitioners in the CFGR study cited some notable disadvantages to 
having the regulators dominate corporate governance in Canada. Several 
pointed to the fact that the commissions have often disregarded findings 
from the courts, are not well-versed in evidentiary rules, and often fail to 
establish principles that can guide lower courts.128 A few felt that there was 
no need for securities regulators to interfere with the carefully engineered 
corporate structure, with one practitioner voicing the common sentiment 
that “what’s in the best interest of the shareholder doesn’t align with better 
governance—that’s where [the practice] falls down.”129 
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Overall, the practitioners’ viewpoints in terms of the appropriateness 
of the commissions’ role in governance tended to vary. The majority of 
practitioners felt the regulators were “better than the alternative.”130 For 
example, a few practitioners noted how the Alberta Securities 
Commission has been quite effective in reform, commenting on how their 
past involvement in the National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance 
Guidelines131 has helped increase the overall quality of corporate 
governance in Canada. Absent the securities commissions establishing 
rules and guidelines and the courts enforcing them, Canada would not have 
the robust system that exists today. Another pointed out that the 
commissions have probably gone as far as they can in the governance 
sphere, and “having got to that point, nobody’s going to come out today 
and say, oh get rid of all that, it doesn’t do anything.”132 Some pointed to 
how the commissions have “been a positive in creating more fairness in 
transactions” under MI 61-101.133 Whether the practitioners agreed or 
disagreed with what the securities commissions did generally, many 
conceded that the regulators are “knowledgeable and better equipped” than 
governmental or judicial bodies in the field, and the courts are helpful in 
providing outside constraints when the securities commissions” become a 
little bit too zealous.”134 
E. The Future of Canadian Corporate Law 
In the CFGR study, practitioners’ views on Canada’s overall model 
of governance tended to depend in large part on what each practitioner 
found most compelling: the constancy of the corporate statutes and 
trajectory of the common law, or the power and influence held by the 
securities regulators.135 Leaving aside change of control transactions for 
the moment, the building blocks of Canadian corporate law have some 
notable differences when compared to the academic definition of  
Anglo-American shareholder primacy, and common law developments 
have emphasized those differences. The legislation requires management 
to act in the “best interests of the corporation” while the oppression 
remedy and other minority protections are fused into our statutes and 
common laws. Taken with the 2004 Peoples decision and the 2008 BCE 
decision, practitioners tended to agree that Canadian corporate law has 
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“overtones of a broader stakeholder model.”136 One practitioner put it 
succinctly: 
In fact, the shareholders do not have primacy in the corporate context 
in Canada, although directors generally think that they do. It’s a very 
difficult distinction that the Canadian courts made based upon our 
corporate statutes and it’s a very difficult distinction to explain to 
boards of directors.137 
And perhaps this difficult distinction may be why many practitioners 
in the CFGR study tended to keep those nuances in a Canadian model 
limited to boilerplate provisions. Several practitioners found the 
differences in Canadian law compelling and important, but the majority 
found the practical impact of these differences largely boiled down to a 
change of the process in corporate decision-making only.138 Indeed, as one 
practitioner commented, “the areas of distinction between Canada and 
U.S. that’s recognized by high-end M&A corporate lawyers in Canada 
probably isn’t recognized anywhere else.”139 Another practitioner found 
the distinction to be due to the fact that “the Canadian public, in my mind, 
is so influenced by the U.S. experience, the U.S. media, and U.S. 
information that it doesn’t even know whether the law in Canada is the 
same or different.”140 For many practitioners, de-emphasizing the 
difference does little to no harm; from a legal standpoint, keeping the focus 
on ensuring the process is complied with, even if one ends up with the 
same answer, is a far less controversial route. 
The conflicting theoretical positions from the courts and the 
securities commissions have enriched the dialogue on the current 
environment of Canadian corporate governance. One practitioner 
expressed how “we’re still digesting the BCE decision—we’ve got a ways 
to go” and another wondered if Canada is experiencing “an overture in 
decisions.”141 While most felt that Canadian governance norms and culture 
are becoming quite well-developed, the frequent pull in different 
directions from the regulators and influential power sources in Canada has 
left Canadian governance in a “period of uncertainty . . . we’re still trying 
to figure out what the model should be.”142 Corporate statutes have not 
changed, but power dynamics can shift. The rise of board education and 
influence has created more robust mechanisms to govern corporations, 
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while the mobilization of collective action by shareholder advisory groups, 
like the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance and the Institutional 
Shareholder Services Inc., has meant that that the institutional investors in 
Canada are a significant force to be reckoned with.143 
Canadian common law has made the process of considering 
stakeholders in the best interests of the corporation more overt, well 
beyond what is assumed in Anglo-American corporate legal scholarship. 
Layered onto this corporate legal base, the securities commissions have 
provided other measures to bolster the field of corporate governance in 
Canada while seeking to protect the integrity of the capital markets and 
the interests of investors within those markets. These efforts, along with 
those from other organizations, have raised and normalized governance 
standards, created more robust checks and balances, and helped to develop 
a stronger voice in the corporate governance movement within the last 
several decades of Canadian history. 
In summary, with respect to the directors’ consideration of 
stakeholder interests specifically, these considerations are already required 
under Canadian laws. The directors’ duties to the “best interests of the 
corporation” and strong minority stakeholder protections have already 
codified the importance of stakeholder considerations in Canadian 
statutes. For anyone that was doubtful of the impact of these existing laws, 
the decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples and BCE have 
confirmed the notion that boards are to consider stakeholder interests in 
their decision-making. Indeed, leading practitioners across Canada have 
acknowledged that they are continually advising their clients to record 
evidence of the consideration of stakeholder interests, implementing a 
documentation process beyond what is required under the laws to better 
protect their clients from liability risks.  
Since BCE, there has been a notable shift in the debates in Canadian 
corporate governance. Leading corporate law textbooks in Canada have 
been updated and revised to reflect the changing governance landscape 
after the SCC decisions.144 The theme of the National Conference of the 
Institute of Corporate Directors, representing more than 9,000 directors 
across Canada, in 2012 was “Sustainable Development: Embracing 
Environmental, Social and Geopolitical Challenges Responsibly.”145 
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These examples are but a few. The path that the common law is embarking 
upon is uncharted, and while practitioners continue to wrestle with the 
ramifications of the BCE decision, one thing seems certain: the Supreme 
Court of Canada has taken the concept of shareholder primacy and has 
stood it on its head.   
III. WHY CANADA SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE BENEFIT CORPORATION 
The implementation of a benefit corporation in Canada, when 
compared to several of the findings in Part II, raises some immediate 
concerns regarding redundancy when compared to Canadian corporate 
laws. The most significant legal innovation in the American benefit 
corporation is the requirement that directors consider stakeholder interests 
in their decision-making.146 This feature echoes what is already available 
under Canadian laws, specifically under the requirement that directors 
manage the corporation in the “best interests of the corporation,” the 
oppression remedy, and findings from the Peoples and BCE decision 
regarding the consideration of stakeholder interests.147 Indeed, as indicated 
by the practitioners, the effect of the BCE decision has made this particular 
requirement to consider stakeholder interests much more potent, as 
directors feel the pressure to document and record evidence of the process 
they took to consider stakeholders’ interests in their decisions.148 On this 
requirement alone, the Canadian model of governance is already more 
stringent than this legal offering by the benefit corporation. 
Numerous practitioners in the CFGR study cited how, in practice, the 
“best interests of the corporation” and consideration of stakeholders leads, 
more often than not, to the same conclusion that would be reached if 
directors’ fiduciary duties were solely for the shareholders’ best 
interests.149 This would certainly be the case under the auspices of a benefit 
corporation as well, given the business case for considering stakeholders 
in order to improve long-term corporate performance. There are also those 
who would argue that the benefit corporation is better equipped to pursue 
a social value mandate when this pursuit runs against economic interests 
of the company. This may be correct, but not for reasons that have 
anything to do with the construction of the corporate laws. Flexibility in 
corporate decision-making in Canada was not lost on the senior 
practitioners in the CFGR study. The board is not confined to short-term 
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profit or share value, nor required to consider only shareholders’ interests. 
The board does not simply act as an auctioneer in the face of a takeover 
bid, as per Revlon in the United States,150 but is required to determine what 
is in the best interests of the corporation. As for what equates to the best 
interests of the corporation, that is up to the directors to determine. The 
SCC also specifically validated the business judgment rule in Peoples and 
BCE.151 This is in addition to the SCC’s comment that directors are to look 
to the best interests of the corporation “viewed as a good corporate 
citizen.”152 If there is any legal import to be taken behind those words (and 
one day, there may), then in that sense, all Canadian corporations should 
be acting as benefit corporations. 
There is also a need here to point out the differences from a private 
versus public company standpoint. A private corporation in Canada that 
falls outside the purview of the securities regulators has little to fear in 
pursuing a dual mandate. In its simplest form, as one practitioner put it, 
“that person can be the shareholder, director, president, and chief bottle 
washer . . . their interests are aligned with the company’s interest so the 
better the company does, the better they do.”153 Closely held companies 
can pursue whatever mandate they want without conflict if there is 
agreement, and indeed, several practitioners in the CFGR study practicing 
in the private company sphere were clear that these companies had great 
flexibility to pursue profit-maximizing goals, corporate social 
responsibility, and entirely philanthropic and/or social goals, among other 
things. If a company elects to expand its shareholder base and cultivates 
it, there is little concern in pursuing a dual mission of economic and social 
value in its corporate pursuits.154 Provided that the board’s decision is 
within a range of reasonable alternatives, the court will always defer to 
that judgment. Directors pursuing dual mandates are well-protected under 
Canadian corporate laws. 
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On the other hand, it is much harder for public companies to move 
away from focusing on shareholders’ interests, which most often translates 
to meaning an increase in share value. This is due to a variety of reasons, 
including general competitive business pressures—directors are under 
much higher scrutiny and institutional shareholders hold considerable 
influence, among other things. These pressures tend to force companies to 
be drawn to the short-term bottom line, which, at times, is to a company’s 
own detriment,155 and there have been movements, led by organizations 
that hold considerable weight in Canada, to combat this type of short-term 
behavior.156 Because the question being examined is in regard to the added 
value of implementing benefit corporation legislation in Canada, there do 
not seem to be any added legal features in the benefit corporation that 
would combat any of the pressures that exist for the regular Canadian 
public corporation. The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation requires a 
benefit director to be on the publicly traded benefit corporation’s board—
which one would assume is only meant to identify the specific tasks 
beholden to the benefit director and not the inherent reflection of a unique 
intent behind the benefit director’s decision-making, as all directors are 
beholden to their fiduciary duties.157 Other than this feature, there are 
currently no other protections offered to support the social benefit side of 
the benefit corporation in a public company context. The legislation is not 
equipped to counter the pressures that public companies face in the global 
capital markets. Section D of Part II touched upon how Canada’s legal and 
regulatory landscape is in a theoretical conflict with the securities 
commissions, which have a significant voice in governance practices. By 
nature, these regulations are designed to protect shareholders, and 
shareholders’ approvals on governance matters have grown considerably 
in the last few decades. Public benefit corporations would still be subject 
to rules regarding takeover bids and defensive tactics, including any sort 
of amendments. Benefit corporations would have the exact same issues as 
all other public companies in that regard. 
As noted in Part I, Vermont’s legislation does specifically state that 
directors, in considering the long-term and short-term interests of the 
benefit corporation, may determine that those interests “may be best 
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served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation.”158 The 
added statement may offer some solace if directors are particularly 
struggling in their decision and fear certain ramifications in the face of a 
takeover bid. From a corporate theorist’s perspective, the added statement 
is not necessary as directors already have that right under Canadian laws. 
Practitioners in the CFGR study elaborated on how in select 
circumstances, even in a public company context, an alternative decision 
other than the highest bid offer, though rare, is already feasible in 
Canada.159 Legal advisors would simply not recommend testing the 
parameters unless the conditions were right, but that is beside the point. 
There may be business reasons for inserting this language beyond what is 
necessary in the law, and that is understandable. It is just unclear if 
corporate legislation is the appropriate place for it as opposed to 
contractual means, as the board discretion already exists in Canada, and 
regardless, takeovers in a public company context would still be subject to 
the usual takeover bid rules issued by the securities regulators. 
When the stakeholder requirements are stripped away from the 
benefit corporation structure, the remaining legal elements seem 
somewhat bare. The requirement that a benefit corporation create “a 
general public benefit measured by a third-party standard” seems 
impressive at first glance, but a cursory glance at the benefit corporations 
listed on the Benefit Corporation Information Center’s directory indicates 
that there are would be very few businesses that consider themselves 
excluded from this standard.160 How does the sale of pastries, for example, 
provide a general public benefit? How does a regular cleaning business 
(with no mention of anything publicly beneficial on its website, not even 
eco-cleaning supplies) create a public benefit? 161 One practitioner in the 
CFGR study mentioned Coca-Cola’s somewhat counterintuitive campaign 
to fight obesity.162 Could Coca-Cola be a benefit corporation? The  
“third-party standard” measure seems to be a low one. Any corporation 
that has embraced the CSR movement and adopted some form of CSR 
practices in their business can become a benefit corporation. Benefit 
corporations also have no legal features to combat the limitations in  
CSR. Empirical studies have shown that CSR trends have been  
consistent with theories of strategic CSR and rational, profit-seeking  
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management decision-making.163 “Greenwashing”—where companies 
spend significantly more time and money on green advertising rather than 
on environmentally sound practices—is a real concern.164 There are no 
built-in legal mechanisms to prevent this type of corporate behavior in a 
benefit corporation beyond what is already available for regular Canadian 
corporations. 
The trouble is that the benefit corporation’s definition of a “general 
public benefit” fits perfectly into the dogma that has been at the core of 
modern economics since Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, where he 
famously opined: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest.”165 Smith’s concept of the ‘invisible hand’ has 
resonated within the theoretical economic underpinnings of the 
corporation for some time now. It postulates that shareholders have 
powerful incentives to maximize the value of the firm and monitor 
corporate directors’ and officers’ conduct. Managers, as shareholders’ 
agents, seek to maximize shareholder wealth through the increase of share 
value and dividend payments, which presumably includes ensuring that 
stakeholders are appeased166 and ultimately translates into benefits to 
consumers and society as a whole. Charles Elson, an advocate of 
shareholder primacy in the U.S., stated: “It’s politically correct to suggest 
that a company benefit the public rather than its investors. But investors 
are the public.”167 If indeed the proponents behind the benefit corporation 
believe the hybrid is offering something clearly different from the 
mainstream corporation, and presumably they do, their legal features need 
to be more explicit and set them apart from the classic economic definition 
of how business translates to public benefit. Of course, benefit 
corporations also have the option to include the requirement to produce a 
“specific public benefit” in their governing documents —but so can a 
regular Canadian corporation. 
The last two elements of the benefit corporation to be discussed 
briefly are its benefit enforcement proceedings and its annual reporting 
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requirements. As discussed in Part I, directors in a benefit corporation have 
fiduciary duties only to those persons entitled to bring about a benefit 
enforcement proceeding against the benefit corporation. As seen in 
Section B of Part II, the benefit enforcement proceeding is less stringent 
than the Canadian oppression remedy, which is available to stakeholders 
against majority shareholders, and through derivative actions claims 
which can be made against directors for violating their duties to the 
corporation. This is in addition to protections under MI 61-101 in a public 
company context.168 The legislation does indicate that proceedings can be 
brought against directors for failing to pursue a public benefit, but as 
earlier stated, there are inherent problems with the definition of public 
benefit, thus it would seem unlikely anyone would be able to bring a valid 
claim under that provision that would not already be captured under other 
tortious claims. 
The annual benefit reporting requirement is certainly something that 
is not required of Canadian private companies. Public companies have 
their own disclosure requirements that presumably would capture much of 
the content within the benefit corporation’s reporting requirements, but 
private companies do not have ‘benefit’ reporting requirements. 
Therefore, this legal feature does offer something that private Canadian 
companies seeking to pursue both economic and social value are not 
required to implement. However, it remains to be seen whether annual 
benefit reporting will include disclosures more substantial than puff pieces 
provided by the businesses to promote their brand as ‘good’ companies. 
Overall, there is a concern that the benefit corporation may resort to 
a branding exercise if it is implemented in Canada. The value likely lies in 
the marketing and branding for ‘do-gooding’ corporations, not in making 
any legal sense as a distinct alternative to the mainstream corporate model. 
There are no meaningful teeth behind the benefit corporation legislation, 
and its offerings to Canadian corporate law are minimal. In fact, some of 
its standards are weaker, such as the minority protection statutes, which 
pale in comparison to Canada’s oppression remedy. Even worse, the 
adoption of the benefit corporation may only confuse or misrepresent the 
current state of Canadian corporate law. If the hybrid is regarded as a clear 
alternative to the mainstream corporate model, there is a risk that 
entrepreneurs may erroneously think that they are not able to pursue both 
social and economic value in their businesses without running some sort 
of legal risk. That would hinder the very social goals that leaders behind 
the benefit corporation are presumably trying to achieve. 
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Of late, the Canadian federal government has made some significant 
moves to foster the burgeoning field of social enterprises. In 2016, the 
Ministry of Innovation, Science, and Economic Development provided the 
following definition on its website: “A social enterprise seeks to achieve 
social, cultural or environmental aims through the sale of goods and 
services. The social enterprise can be for-profit or not-for-profit but the 
majority of net profits must be directed to a social objective with limited 
distribution to shareholders and owners.”169 At the same time, the federal 
government began the development of a national Social Enterprises 
Directory on its Canadian Company Capabilities database.170 
Organizations that self-identify as social enterprises based on the 
Ministry’s definition are permitted to register and be featured on the 
directory. 
The definition provided by the federal government is, in most all 
respects, a higher standard of expectation on what constitutes a social 
enterprise when compared to the benefit corporation. Benefit corporations 
have no obligation to direct their net profits to a social objective. While 
their purpose is to create a “general public benefit,” as aforementioned this 
broad definition can apply to a wide variety of businesses with little 
change to the status quo, and there are no restrictions on the amounts that 
boards can declare as dividends to their shareholders. How many current 
benefit corporations would fall under the ambit of Canada’s definition of 
social enterprise? In providing a definition, the Canadian government has 
gone ahead and raised the bar on what kind of businesses should be  
self-labelling as social enterprises. This is how Canada is choosing to 
address this burgeoning field, and these are early days.   
There are good reasons for Canada to wait and see how the benefit 
corporation fares in the longer term. Indeed, discussions are bubbling up 
in the United States as more practitioners are beginning to pay attention to 
the benefit corporation in states with “other constituency” statutes, among 
other nuances in its corporate laws.171 This author suggests patience, 
further research, and a willingness from Canadian social leaders backing 
the benefit corporation to better understand the state of Canadian corporate 
governance and its trajectory given recent court decisions and emerging 
business megatrends. The American benefit corporation movement is 
designed to address American corporate governance needs for corporate 
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reform and social progress. Within the global development of social 
enterprises and accompanying hybrid business laws, Canada needs a 
made-in-Canada approach. 
CONCLUSION 
The leaders of the B Corporation certification have made 
considerable strides within the United States to collect like-minded 
corporate leaders and bring them together to work towards improving the 
world in which we live. For their efforts, they should be commended. In 
only a short number of years, the B Corporation has managed to situate 
itself squarely within the niche of business law as it relates to the CSR 
movement. The B Corporation certification process carries with it many 
virtues in helping to improve the American business landscape, and 
hopefully it will have continued success. 
B Lab’s lobbying effort to create benefit corporation laws across the 
United States has been an interesting one, and rather remarkable given the 
number of states that have willingly adopted these laws. As for B Lab’s 
past lobbying efforts to implement the benefit corporation in Canada, this 
Article has identified how some of B Lab’s efforts may be misplaced and 
potentially detrimental to the legal development and progress in Canada, 
and could as well for other countries if tried there. B Lab should be 
cognizant of these risks as they champion American ideals of corporate 
goodness within other legal systems. Having the support of a handful of 
local advocates does not negate these risks, nor absolve B Lab from 
ignorance over local and national laws, customs, and culture. 
Some clarifications need to be made at this point. While this author 
does not doubt the sincerity of the leaders of B Lab in improving the world, 
their eagerness to market benefit corporation laws worldwide needs to be 
tempered and carefully guarded against ethnocentrism. The goal is to 
change the corporate landscape and support businesses that govern 
themselves as they seek out ways to improve the world. B Lab has 
acknowledged that Canada is an important “market” for them as there are 
now more than 160 Certified B Corporations in Canada. B Lab has also 
indicated that the obligation to consider stakeholder interests must be 
100% affirmed under Canadian law before they will allow Canadian 
companies to forego their article amendment process. When told of 
Canada’s statutory requirement that directors exercise their fiduciary 
duties in the “best interests of the corporation,” the oppression remedy and 
other minority protections, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2008 BCE 
decision, etc., B Lab’s position did not change. It seems that the only way 
B Lab can be satisfied is if Canadian statutes provide language that mirrors 
the B Corporation’s. This is problematic.  
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B Lab has also cited legal memoranda produced pro bono by 
Canadian lawyers verifying the B Corporation amendments as a reason it 
remains necessary. The nature of these memoranda are to respond to 
questions posed by B Lab, which presumably asks whether there were any 
inherent risks under Canadian law in requiring companies to adopt the 
language B Lab has offered. The affirmation that there is little risk does 
not in itself imply that the language is needed. Responding to a question 
on legal risk is far different than addressing the policy need and 
implications behind the implementation of particular laws. 
While Canadian corporate laws are often quietly lumped together 
with American legal scholarship under the assumption that the 
fundamentals of Canadian governance mirror those in the United States, 
that is simply not accurate. Certainly, Canadian laws do have features that 
in many ways reflect and respond to those in the United States—but just 
as there are cultural similarities between the two nations, there are also 
stark differences.172 These differences need to be taken into account before 
implementing American hybrid alternatives with features that are weaker 
from a social governance standpoint than Canada’s existing laws. 
There is one final point to consider regarding the future of the benefit 
corporation, and B Lab’s ongoing pursuit of global influence and impact. 
This Article began with the statement that business law does not exist in a 
vacuum. On November 8, 2016, Canada and the rest of the world watched 
as American voters elected Donald Trump as their next President of the 
United States. As B Lab contemplates its next moves in the world, perhaps 
the organization should concentrate on its own American constituents, and 
prepare for the inevitable battles that are going to arise as their new 
President takes office. As a great deal of the country’s reputational capital 
around the world will likely be the squandered over the next few years, 
this author hopes B Lab will be emboldened to take their lobbying clout 
and focus on protecting the environment, the marginalized, the weak, and 
those that become targets of hate under this new administration. To be 
complicit now would ring hollow B Lab’s message to “use business as a 
force for good” and “B the Change.”173 Now is the chance for B Lab to 
take a more meaningful leadership role in good business in its own home 
country. Canada will be watching. 
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